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I. THE ELECTROCARDIOGRAM
The following brief but excellent definition and history of
electrocardiography is contained in Nichols v. Sanborn Co.'
Electrocardiography relates to the recording in the form of a graph
of certain minute electric currents produced by the human heart
Consulting Attorney to the American Medical Association.
35 F.Supp. 707 (D. Mass. 1940); af'd 124 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1942).
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in the course of its action. Although the existence of such cur-
rents was known as early as the middle of the last century, it was
not until 1903 that an instrument able to detect and record them
was invented. This instrument is known as the Einthoven quartz
string galvanometer, named after its inventor. It consists of a
very fine quartz string, gold-plated, which is suspended in a mag-
netic field. When current passes through the string, the string
moves, and by photographing its excursions, a record of its move-
ments may be produced. The electric currents produced by the
heart are connected to the string galvanometer by means of elec-
trodes attached to the arms or to one arm and one leg of the pa-
tient. When a galvanometer is thus connected to the human body,
there is produced, in addition to the heart currents, a constant
current of considerably higher amplitude than the currents pro-
duced by the action of the heart. This constant current is called
the skin current. In order to record the action of the heart without
overloading a sensitive instrument such as the Einthoven string
galvanometer it is necessary to overcome the effect of the skin cur-
rent. In practice this is usually done by introducing from some
external source into the galvanometer circuit a voltage equal in
amount and opposite in polarity to that produced by the skin cur-
rent. Since skin current varies from time to time and with the
individual, this neutralizing voltage must be readjusted from time
to time as the instrument is used.
As a result of the invention of the Einthoven string galvanometer,
the growth of the modern science of electrocardiography was
made possible. This, of course, is a medical science.2
ADmISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF ELECTROCAIOGRAm
Of the admissibility in evidence of an electrocardiogram, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Myers v. Travelers Ins. Co.,3
declared: "[T]here would be no unlawful invasion of plaintiff's
rights if competent physicians at a reasonable time and place
physically examined him, aided by such mechanical devices as...
electrocardiograph . . . . Such matters are within the discretion
of the court."4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Croll v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.5 stated:
"The doctor's office records as well as the electrocardiogram were
properly admitted into evidence under both the Federal Business
Records Act, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1732, and the Pennsylvania statute."6
The electrocardiogram was held admissible in evidence by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Kramer v. John Han-
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,7 in 1954. And the Court of Appeals of
2 35 F.Supp. at 708.
3 353 Pa. 523, 46 A.2d 224 (1946).
4 Id. at 528, 46 A.2d at 226.
5 198 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1952).
6 Id. at 565.
7 336 Mass. 465, 468, 146 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1954).
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New York in People v. Magris in 1958 stated: "Almost daily, re-
productions by ... electrocardiograms ... among a variety of
kindred scientific methods, are freely accepted in our courts for
their general reliability, without the necessity of offering expert
testimony as to the scientific principles underlying them."9
In Division of Labor Law Enforcement, Dep't. of Indus. Rela-
tions v. Gifford,o it was disclosed that it is a hospital practice to
include electrocardiographic tracings in a patient's medical record
if the patient was confined in the hospital at the time they were
taken, even though they are the property of the physician who
ordered them.
PHYSICIAN CANNOT TESTIFY AS TO ELEcTRocARDIOGRAmI WITHOUT
PRODUCING IT
In Lefebyre v. Western Coal & Mining Co.," a workmen's com-
pensation case decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1930,
the plaintiff contended that the arbitrator was guilty of serious
misconduct in permitting a Dr. Major to testify as to what was
shown by an electrocardiogram which was taken at a hospital in
Kansas City, without producing this electrocardiogram in court for
the purpose of cross-examination and submission to the plaintiff's
medical experts for their opinion. The court declared:
It was error for the arbitrator to permit Dr. Major to testify as to
what was shown by an electrocardiogram without producing it at
the hearing. The doctor stated as his excuse that it was part of
the hospital records and could not be taken from the hospital, but
that a copy could be obtained. We know of no rule of law that
places hospital records in any privileged class. They can certainly
be produced in court the same as the records of a corporation or
any other records, corporate or private, which may be necessary to
do full justice between litigants. The cardiogram should have been
produced in court so that plaintiff could have used it for the pur-
pose of cross-examination and for submission to his own medical
experts for their examination and to enable them to testify as to
their interpretation in the event they disagreed with the doctor who
interpreted it on behalf of defendant. 12
ELECTROCARDIOGRAPHIC RECORDINGS AND INTERPRETING
The making of an electrocardiogram is a comparatively simple
procedure and may be done by a trained lay technician; however,
8 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728 (1958).
9 Id. at 566, 147 N.E.2d at 730.
10 137 Cal. App. 2d 259, 290 P.2d 281 (1955).
11 131 Kan. 1, 289 P. 456 (1930).
12 Id. at 9, 289 P. at 460.
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interpreting an electrocardiogram is much more difficult and de-
manding and must be done by a physician, usually a cardiologist
or internist. As Joseph E. F. Riseman, M.D., points out,
Electrocardiograms are taken under uniform or standard condi-
tions all over the world. The tracing usually is recorded by a
trained technician and does not have to be obtained, or recorded,
by the physician personally. The amount of training needed by
the technician does not require any unusual amount of previous
medical education or knowledge.
Interpretation of the electrocardiogram, however, requires a
certain amount of knowledge, a considerable amount of experience
and a great deal of common sense. This requires medical training
and although in many communities the tracings are usually inter-
preted by specialists (especially those specializing in cardiology or
internal medicine) they can also be interpreted by a trained gen-
eral practitioner.13
It would seem that more weight would be accorded the interpre-
tation of electrocardiographic tracings by a medical witness who
is a cardiologist than one who is a general practitioner.
PHYsiciAN WHO TEsTIFIEs AS TO ELECTROcARDIOGRAM DOES NOT HAVE
TO HAVE MADE IT
In Randolph v. Woman's Club,14 a workmen's compensation
case decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1941, Otto
Lowy, M.D., a specialist in pathology and diagnosis, examined the
plaintiff twice. The first examination consisted of a complete phy-
sical, fluoroscopic, electrocardiographic, and laboratory examination.
From this Dr. Lowy discovered that the plaintiff's left auricle was
enlarged, that she had a ventricular extra systole, and a tachy-
cardia. The second examination revealed the same thing as the
first examination plus a prominent aortic second sound.
The defendant argued that the electrocardiogram was inad-
missible as hearsay because it was not prepared by Dr. Lowy. The
court characterized this argument as "without foundation." The
court observed that the electrocardiogram was made under Dr.
Lowy's "direction and supervision and it was he who interpreted
the results shown."'15
VALUE OF ELECTROCARDmIOGRAm LIES IN PLURALITY FOR PURPOSE: OF
COAVAISON
As Dr. Riseman points out: "In order to be of value the elec-
2s Riseman, Trauma and Angina Pectoris, 4 TRAumA, Oct. 1962, at 5, 29
[hereinafter cited as Riseman].
14 127 N.J.L. 49, 21 A.2d 324 (1941).
15 Id. at 52, 21 A.2d at 326.
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trocardiogram must be taken at appropriate time intervals. This
involves taking tracings early in the disease and repeating the trac-
ing at intervals of a few days to a few weeks in order to study the
progressive or serial changes."' 6
If there are two or more electrocardiograms taken at different
times which are in existence and obtainable, a court will not per-
mit a medical witness who is giving an electrocardiographic in-
terpretation to be restricted to one electrocardiogram. In Leibowitz
v. Massachusetts Indem. Ins. Co.,1 7 a Dr. DeGraff, a cardiologist
called as a medical witness by the defendant insurance company,
testified that he found nothing abnormal in an electrocardiogram
taken by the plaintiff's physician on December 24, 1941. Dr. De-
Graff himself examined the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant on
January 31, 1942, and took an electrocardiogram.
Dr. DeGraff was then questioned about an electrocardiogram
taken by the plaintiff's physician on February 19, 1943. Dr. De-
Graff testified that the February, 1943, electrocardiogram showed
that something had happened to the plaintiff's heart since he ex-
amined it: "There is a suggestion that this man may have suf-
fered some damage to the posterior wall of his heart." Dr. DeGraff
then testified that while the February, 1943, electrocardiogram was
suggestive he "would like to see another electrocardiogram taken
subsequently to confirm this."
Counsel for the plaintiff then attempted to submit to Dr. De-
Graff an electrocardiogram taken by the plaintiff's physician on
May 26, 1943, after the period of alleged disability for which suit
was brought, and to question him about it. The lower court re-
fused to permit this. On appeal, the higher court concluded: "In
our opinion, this improper restriction on the cross-examination of
Dr. DeGraff ... was erroneous and highly prejudicial."
CLINICAL CORRELATION
An electrocardiogram alone, without thorough clinical corre-
lation, can at best permit only partial diagnosis of the cardiac
condition. A medical cyclopedia designed for lawyers states:
The ECG [electrocardiogram] does not furnish a pathologic or
clinical diagnosis, but indicates only the state of the myocardium
(heart muscle) in electrophysiologic terms at the precise moment
of its recording ....
Proper interpretation and clinical correlation require a com-
16 Riseman, supra note 13, at 44.
17 48 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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plete history and physical examination and other laboratory studies
as well. With the information obtained, the physician can distin-
guish the many disease entities that mimic specific and non-spe-
cific ECG patterns. Proper diagnosis must correlate the full his-
tory and objective findings for each individual patient with the
necessary laboratory studies. Proper correlation requires the total
knowledge and experience of the attending physician.' 8
II. THE MYELOGRAM
A myelogram was defined in 1965 by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania in Bostic v. Dreher"9 as "a diagnostic procedure which
involves the injection of an opaque solution into the spinal canal.
The patient's torso is then tilted so that the dye may infiltrate
the intervertebral disc spaces. X-rays are taken to reveal ab-
normalities.
' '20
A myelogram, according to the Court of Appeals of Georgia in
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Barfield, 21 is a
procedure to help determine the existence of spinal disc lesions
... it consists of making a spinal puncture and placing within the
spinal canal an iodine containing oil, which casts a shadow on
X-ray; tilting the patient and obtaining X-ray pictures with the
needle in place, and then withdrawing the oil and removing the
needle... some people have headaches and backaches for a week
or 10 days following the myelogram [but] many do not . . . the
procedure is not 100% accurate, but [does] pick up at least 70%
of the disc lesions, including any massive ones .... 22
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN MAY TESTIFY AS TO PATHOLOGY
REVEALED BY MYELOGRAm
In 1964 in Hickey v. Chicago Transit Authority,23 the Appellate
Court of Illinois held that it is proper for an attending physician
to testify with respect to the pathology revealed by a myelogram,
even though he did not perform the myelograrn. However, the
myelogram must be produced and put in evidence so as to furnish
the basis for cross-examination.
No INTRODUCTION IN EvIDENcE OF MYELOGRAm AFTER HEARING OR TRIAL
In Gonzales v. Johnston Foil Mfg. Co.,24 approximately one
18 5 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 80, § 34.14 (1960).
19 206 Pa. Super. 257, 213 A.2d 118 (1965).
20 Id. at 259 n. 1, 213 A.2d at 119 n. 1.
21 89 Ga. App. 562, 80 S.E.2d 84 (1954).
22 Id. at 564, 80 S.E.2d at 85.
23 52 Ill. App. 2d 132, 201 N.E.2d 742 (1964).
24 305 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
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year after the employee filed her notice of appeal from the final
award made by the Industrial Commission to the circuit court, she
filed in the circuit court a motion to remand, wherein she requested
the circuit court to remand her case to the Industrial Commission
so that she could place in the record the results of a myelogram
made subsequent to Industrial Commission's final award and while
the case was pending disposition in the circuit court.
The employee contended that all the liberal and humanitarian
elements of the Workmen's Compensation Act demanded that her
case be remanded to the Industrial Commission so that she could
offer evidence of the results of the myelogram. The circuit court
denied her motion to remand, and she appealed this ruling by the
circuit court to the St. Louis (Missouri) Court of Appeals.
The appellate court upheld the action of the circuit court. The
court of appeals declared:
To permit the employee, or, for that matter, the employer and in-
surer, to bring in new evidence after a final award has been made
by the Commission, would seriously interfere with the finality of
the Workmen's Compensation proceedings. If such a course was
permitted, claimant could await the Commission's decision and if
it was adverse, then search for new evidence in an effort to set
aside the Commission's Award. Applying the aforesaid to the
facts in this case, the employee, being uncertain of what results a
myelogram would show, could postpone the test and rely on the
opinions of her medical witnesses that she had a disc lesion and
then await the Commission's action on the award. If the Commis-
sion's findings and award were adverse to the employee she
could then, with nothing to lose, submit to the myelogram test
and if the test was favorable to her, she could then ask the Com-
mission to reopen the proceedings for further medical testimony.
It is our opinion that having elected to submit her case on the
evidence then available, she shouldn't be permitted to alter her
trial strategy. 25
MAY EMPLOYEE BE COMPELLED TO UNDERGO MYELOGRAM?
In Wilson v. Rochester Prods. Div., Gen. Motors Corp.,26 a
self-insured employer appealed from an award of the Workmen's
Compensation Board granting disability compensation. The employ-
er's sole contention was that the claimant's refusal to submit to a
myelogram was unreasonable, and that the claimant should be
denied compensation by reason thereof.
The Board had found that the claimant's refusal to undergo
the myelogram was reasonable. Most of the medical testimony
25 Id. at 55.
26 282 App. Div. 973, 125 N.Y.S.2d 324 (3d Dep't 1953).
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was to the effect that the myelogram is not harmful or injurious,
is necessary for proper diagnoses, and that the claimant's refusal
was unreasonable. However, there was medical testimony to the
contrary, with a qualification as to time. The claimant's physician
testified that the claimant should not submit to a myelogram, using
such words as "at the present time" and "at this time." The Ap-
pellate Division stated:
We think the matter should be remitted to the Board for further
development of medical testimony as of a later date. The proposed
test is an aid to diagnoses only and in itself furnishes no relief.
If the test indicates a herniated intervertebral disc subsequent
surgery is necessary for relief, and the reasonableness of such op-
erative procedure should also be developed. Award reversed and
the matter remitted to the Workmen's Compensation Board for
further proceedings .... 27
In the Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. case the employer, Colonial
Stores, Inc., and its insurance carrier appealed from a judgment of
the Superior Court affirming the judgment of the Board of Work-
men's Compensation denying a petition of the employer that the
claimant be ordered to submit to a myelogram and, on her failure
to do so, that compensation payments under a previous award
cease.
The evidence consisted of the testimony by deposition of a
physician employed by the employer, to the effect that it was pos-
sible the claimant had a disc lesion, but the witness would not, in
view of the claimant's "mental overlay," recommend surgery until
he had seen the results of a myelogram. The deputy director (of
the Board of Workmen's Compensation) hearing the evidence noted
that on a previous hearing in this case on change of condition,
three physicians had offered testimony but none had recommended
either a myelogram or surgery, and the director found as a matter
of fact that the claimant was justified in refusing the myelogram.
This finding was affirmed in turn by the Board of Workmen's
Compensation and the Superior Court.
A Georgia statute provides: "[I] f the employee refuses to sub-
mit himself to or in any way obstructs such examination requested
by and provided for by the employer, his right to compensation
... shall be suspended." Another statute provides: "[T]he refusal
of the employee to accept any medical, hospital, surgical or other
treatment when ordered by the Industrial Board shall bar said
employee from further compensation until such refusal ceases."
Georgia jurisprudence, or case law, has already determined that
27 Id. at 973, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
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refusal to submit to surgery will not bar the claimant from bene-
fits under the Workmen's Compensation Act unless the surgery has
been ordered by the Board. And case law has also determined that
the Board has jurisdiction to decide whether a refusal of medical
services is justified.
Surgery, as defined by Webster's International Dictionary, is
"that branch of medical science concerned with the correction of
deformities, repair of injuries, diagnosis and cure of disease, re-
lief of suffering, and prolongation of life by manual and instru-
mental operations."
In referring to a myelogram, the Georgia Court of Appeals
declared:
An examination of the type here sought, which involves the pene-
tration of living tissue, is much closer to a surgical operation than a
simple physical examination, of which the claimant had submitted
to many in the past.
. . . [t]he claimant, upon refusing the myelogram, would not be
automatically barred from receiving further compensation, and
there was sufficient evidence before the Board-including the fact
that the claimant had submitted to all other medical examinations
and treatments suggested, that other doctors, at a previous hearing,
had not recommended this procedure, that the test was not 100%
accurate and was in some cases attended by aftereffects of a painful
nature-to support the award finding that the claimant should not
be compelled to submit to this procedure.
The judge of the Superior Court did not err in affirming the
award of the Board of Workmen's Compensation.28
It seems unfortunate that one of the elements of evidence
which the Georgia court admittedly relied on in arriving at its deci-
sion was the fact that the myelogram is not 100% accurate. The
electrocardiogram and the electroencephalogram, for example, are
both routinely accepted and highly regarded evidentially by
courts while they are, like the myelogram, less than 100% accurate.
In the Bostic case the claimant was employed as a laborer.
While loading a conveyor, he was struck by a stone and injured
his lower back. A myelogram taken by Frederick Goeringer, M.D.,
the chief orthopedic specialist at Misericordia Hospital in Phila-
delphia, revealed a small defect at the interspace between L-5 and
S-1. The claimant was willing to submit to a laminectomy and
Dr. Goeringer wanted to perform that operation.
However, the insurance carrier objected and demanded that
the claimant submit to a second myelogram. Its witness was
28 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Barfield, 89 Ga. App. 562, 564, 80
S.E.2d 84, 85 (1954).
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Leonard Klinghoffer, M.D., a staff specialist in orthopedic sur-
gery at Graduate Hospital, University of Pennsylvania. "He was of
the opinion that claimant 'probably had a herniated disc.'- 29 He
attempted to treat the claimant by pelvic traction, but this did not
improve the condition. Robert Andrew, M.D., a neurosurgeon,
was then called into consultation.
With regard to the first myelogram, Dr. Klinghoffer testified.
as follows: "'Dr. Andrew wasn't impressed with it too much and
he thought he would like to see another myelogram. If this ques-
tionable finding was seen again, then it would have significance.
On the basis of this alone he didn't think he would want to make
a diagnosis of a herniated disc.' "30
The claimant's refusal to submit to a second myelogram was
based upon his reaction to the first one, which assertediy resulted
in the development of phlebitis. The claimant took the position
that a ruptured disc may be diagnosed and repaired without the
performance of a myelogram, and that its indiscriminate use as a
diagnostic technique can lead to serious and harmful side effects.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court stated: "[C]laimant's refusal to
submit to a second myelogram was not without reasonable cause
or excuse."
31
III. THE AORTOGRAM
Aortographic technique is described by Vincent J. O'Conor,
M.D., as follows:
In 1929, the important diagnostic and investigative method of
trans-lumbar aortography was suggested by dos Santos and his
associates of Portugal. During this diagnostic procedure, the pa-
tient lies upon his abdomen and a needle is inserted through the
lumbar muscles on the left side and into the abdominal aortajust below the level of the renal artery. A quick injection of
opaque material is made while films are taken rapidly to show the
vascular pattern, not only of the aorta and its branches, but of
the rental circulation as well. 32
According to Richard N. de Niord, Jr., M.D.,
[tlhe aortogram or injection of the aorta with radiopaque material
has now become an accepted standardized procedure routinely
done in the diagnosis of obliterative vascular disease. This pro-
cedure is usually done for those lesions lying high in the iliac ves-
sels . . . or distal aorta, or indeed can be done in a retrograde
29 Bostic v. Dreher, 206 Pa. Super. 257, 258, 213 A.2d 118, 120 (1965).
20 Id.
31 Id. at 259, 213 A.2d at 121.
32 V. O'CoNoR, CoumRTooM MEDIcINE 348-49 (1958).
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fashion passing a catheter ... either down through the carotid ves-
sels or up through the femoral vessels to inject dye in the region
of the aortic arch . . . for diagnosis of obstructive disease of the
arch or vessels of the head and neck.83
DANGERS IN AORTOGRAPHY
The dangers inherent in aortography were listed by Dr. O'Conor
as:
(1) pain,
(2) hemorrhage,
(3) thrombosis,
(4) embolism,
(5) renal insufficiency,
(6) neurologic disorders,
(7) allergic reactions, and
(8) other systemic disturbances that may be related more to
the general anesthetic in those cases in which it is em-
ployed than they are due to the aortography itself;
and listed by Dr. de Niord as:
(1) bleeding through the needle hole in the aorta,
(2) allergic manifestations,
(3) injection into the spinal canal or vertebral arteries caus-
ing transverse myelitis with paralysis, and
(4) renal damage.
In Slago v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 34 decided
by the District Court of Appeal of California in 1957, the plaintiff-
patient suffered paraplegia after an aortogram was made. All the
expert medical witnesses who testified at the trial agreed that
paralysis is a rare complication of aortography. "This fact [the
court declared] does not prove that it normally does not occur in
the absence of negligence."
None of the defendant-physicians' expert witnesses testified
directly that the paraplegia would not occur without negligence.
One of the witnesses testified that there are risks attendant upon
the aortographic procedure, that vessel occlusion as a result of the
drug used in the procedure is one of the risks which must be
assumed, and that there is little that can be done to guard against
it. A second witness testified that the risks had to be balanced
against the importance to the patient of determining the exact
33 5 LAwYERs' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 82, § 34.16 (1960).
34 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
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diagnosis and the future treatment necessary.
CAUSE OF PARAPLEGIA FOLLOWING AORTOGRAM
With the exception of the patient's expert witness, none of the
witnesses could determine the exact cause of the paraplegia. In
effect, they stated it might have been one of three:
(1) constriction of the blood vessels in the spinal cord,
(2) direct damage to the spinal cord, or
(3) the patient's condition, a partially blocked aorta, arterio-
sclerosis and high blood pressure of several years stand-
ing, obliteration of blood vessels and blood supply to the
legs, was such that sudden and total paralysis could
occur at any moment.
Their testimony was to the effect that the first two conditions
could result from aortography.
The patient's expert witness, from an examination of the
roentgenograms showing the needle in place at the times of two
injections, offered as his expert opinion that the needle at the
time of the second injection was near or in an artery supplying
blood to the spinal column. The defendant-physicians disagreed
with this diagnosis.
There was no testimony that in aortography, without negli-
gence, a needle could be inserted in a spinal artery. In fact, the
testimony was just to the contrary, that there should be no great
difficulty in inserting the needle in the aorta. There was a conflict
in the testimony, the defendant-physicians' expert witnesses testify-
ing in effect that the spinal cord could have been affected even if
the needle has been properly injected in the aorta and that such a
situation might have occurred; the patient's expert witness testi-
fying in effect that the roentgenograms showed the needle to
have been inserted in the wrong place.
WHO PERFORmS AORTOGRAPHY
In addition to the attending physician, four expert witnesses
for the defendant-physicians testified that it is not a general medi-
cal custom in the community for the attending physician to per-
form or to be present at the performance of aortography, but that
it is a general community custom to have the aortographic pro-
cedure performed by the hospital personnel who are accustomed to
working together in the performance of this and other complicated
diagnostic procedures and who perform them regularly. There
was no contradiction of this testimony.
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The court stated that while the attending physician:
ordered the aortogram (and would be responsible for any negli-
gence in prescribing such procedure) he cannot be held liable for
the negligence of the team in the actual performance of it, as he
neither participated in, nor had the right to direct it. When a
patient is placed in a hospital his attending physician orders many
procedures to be undertaken by the hospital staff or employees.
Common examples are urinalyses, blood counts, and X-rays. Sup-
pose that in extracting blood for a count the hospital personnel
negligently infected the patient. It could not be contended that the
attending physician was liable for that negligence. The same is
true here. The attending physician cannot be held liable for acts
over which he had and could have no control.3 5
The patient contended that because the majority of the aorto-
grams, in the San Francisco Bay area, were made in two hospitals,
89 at the University of California Hospital, 168 at Franklin Hos-
pital, 68 at all other hospitals (not including Fort Miley Hospital,
the figures for which were not available), a total of 325, that it
, could not be said there is a general custom but merely a custom of
those two hospitals. The record was not clear as to how many of
.this 325 were performed prior to the patient's aortogram. Con-
servatively at least one-half were. The court held that, assuming
only 162 as the proper figure, the performance of that many aorto-
grams "in a given area in a particular way, should be sufficient to
establish a custom or practice."
INJURIES FOLLOWING ATTEMPTEm AORTOGRAM
In Dill v. Miles,36 the plaintiff-patient, after consultation with
the defendant-physician regarding the diagnosis and treatment of
thrombophlebitis in the lower portion of the calf of his left leg,
was advised to and did enter a hospital, where the physician at-
tempted to make an aortogram. Upon regaining consciousness from
the general anesthetic, the patient was informed by the physician
that aortography had not been performed, that the aorta had not
been located or penetrated, and that nothing had been accom-
plished in the operating room to aid the physician in examining,
diagnosing, or determining the nature and extent of the patient's
ailment.
Immediately upon regaining consciousness, the patient be-
gan experiencing extreme, excruciating, and nauseous pain, and
paralytic sensations in the lower extremities of his body from the
first lumbar to his toes, accompanied by a paralysis of his bladder
35 Id. at 571, 317 P.2d at 178.
36 181 Kan. 350, 354, 310 P.2d 896, 897 (1957).
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and inability to void. Although he asked the physician for diagno-
sis, relief, and treatment of these conditions, the physician did
nothing whatsoever. The patient's condition grew progressively
worse in the next 72 hours, but the physician still did nothing to
diagnose, relieve, or treat such illness, did not advise the patient of
the seriousness of his condition, did not advise calling in another
physician and surgeon, and finally withdrew from the case.
As a result of such neglect the patient sustained the follow-
ing injuries: contusions, abrasion, and lacerations of his back in
the general vicinity of his first lumbar vertebra, paralysis of both
legs, paralysis and loss of control of his bowels, paralysis and loss
of control of his bladder, adhesive arachnitis with paraplegia, sexual
impotency, extreme arthritis, injuries to his spinal cord in the first
lumbar area, permanent damage to his physical and nervous sys-
tem, and great bodily weakness.
PHYsiciAN's NEGLIGENT ACTS IN ATTEMPTImG AORTOGRAPHY
The physician held himself out to the patient to be a specialist
in translumbar aortography and, as such, attempted to make the
aortogram without first performing an allergy test and completing
a preoperative reontgenogram. The physician made insertions of
an 18- gauge needle (6 inches long) without aspirating it, with
accompanying and repeated injections of a chemical dye solution
into the patient's spinal cavity, spinal column, bloodstream, and
body, this being done in such a manner that the aorta was never
located and the blood vessels around the patient's spinal cord were
ruptured.
The court declared: "ED]efendant's conscious conduct indi-
cated a reckless disregard and complete indifference and unconcern
for the probable consequences of his alleged wrongful acts."
37
IV. THE ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM
The electroencephalogram, in the words of 0. Spurgeon Eng-
lish, M.D., and Stuart M. Finch, M.D.,
was introduced by Hans Berger and is essentially a means of re-
cording the electrical potentials of the brain by means of various
leads attached in the form of small wires to the overlying areas of
the skull. The electroencephalogram has proven to be a valuable
diagnostic instrument in localizing various intracranial pathological
conditions.... Often by varying the position of the leads it is
possible to locate brain tumors or other intracranial lesions ac-
curately .... The electroencephalogram records a pulsating rhyth-
37 Id. at 356, 310 P.2d at 899.
812 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 4 (1967)
mical type of electrical potential of which both the frequency and
voltage are measured.38
The electroencephalogram has been defined by the Court of
Appeal of Louisiana in Betz v. Travelers Ins. Co.39 in 1953 as:
"[A] graphic recording of the electrical currents developed in the
cortex by brain action and by this examination it can be deter-
mined whether [a person] actually suffered any damage to his
brain .... "40
ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAMS IN EVIDENCE
In Mayole v. B. Crystal & Son,41 the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York in 1943 held that electroencephalo-
graphic tracings and an interpretation thereof by a medical expert
were admissible in evidence, the court saying: "The [lower] court
committed error in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's medical
witness as to the condition or conditions for which the electro-
encephalogram was a test. It was also error to exclude the electro-
encephalogram and the records respecting it made in the regular
course of business." 42
RETROACTIVE ADMISSIBILITY
On appeal in the Betz suit for compensation for total dis-
ability caused by the explosion of a tank truck on which the em-
ployee-plaintiff was working, the Louisiana Court of Appeal re-
versed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case
to allow the employee to introduce evidence of electroencephalo-
graphic tracings made after the conclusion of the trial showing in-
juries of a permanent disabling nature. The motion to remand had
attached to it a letter from Homer D. Kirgis, M.D., a neurosurgeon
who testified for the employee-plaintiff by deposition taken on
November 19, 1952, in which it was recited that he had an electro-
encephalogram made of the employee to determine whether the
employee suffered a concussion or contusion of the brain. This
report was dated May 23, 1953, which was subsequent to the sub-
mission and rendition of the judgment in the case. Dr. Kirgis was
of the opinion that the employee suffered some injury to his brain
and that his mental condition was real rather than feigned. This
report showed that the physician, H. Tharp Posey, M.D., who
38 0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PsYCHIATRY 497 (1964).
89 68 So.2d 666 (La. App. 1953).
40 Id. at 669.
41 266 App. Div. 1008, 44 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep't 1943).
42 Id. at 1008, 44 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
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made the electroencephalogram, stated that it was very strongly
suggestive of localized brain damage.
The court declared:
If the plaintiff's disability is real, actual, and not feigned, and he
suffers an actual injury to his brain, which would be the basis of
his present complaint and which cannot be properly adjudicated at
this time because the record does not contain the testimony show-
ing the value of this type of evidence in cases of this kind, we
think that the case should be remanded and plaintiff accorded the
right to produce it.
[T]he judgment of the District Court is reversed and this
case remanded for the purpose of permitting the plaintiff to take
the testimony of Dr. H. Tharp Posey and Dr. Homer D. Kirgis as
to the electroencephalogram made of the plaintiff by Dr. H. Tharp
Posey for the purpose of showing whether plaintiff suffers any
brain damage as a result of his injuries and reserving to defend-
ant the right to produce similar evidence, and after said testi-
mony has been taken, that this case be disposed of according to
law. 43
FouNDATIoNs MUST BE LAiD
In Frey v. State,44 decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas in 1961, a Dr. Crowley testified that electroencephalo-
graphic tracings of the robbery defendant's brain showed that he
was normal. Complaint was made of the testimony of Dr. Crow-
ley showing his interpretation of the electroencephalographic trac-
ings of the defendant's brain by a technician because he was not
present during the making of the electroencephalogram, that he
relied on the ability of the technician and there was no evidence
that the machine was working properly.
Dr. Crowley testified that he was in charge of the electro-
encephalographic machine, that it was in good working condition,
that the electroencephalogram was made by a technician under his
supervision, and that he was actually present part of the time while
it was being made. "In this," concluded the court, "no error is
shown."
ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAMS AS BASIs FOR EXPERT OPINION
In Melford v. Gaus & Brown Const. Co.,45 decided by the Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois in 1958, Benjamin H. Kesert, M.D., the
plaintiff's expert in neurology, gave his opinion that the injury
43 Betz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 68 So.2d 666, 670 (La. App. 1953).
44 171 Tex. Cr. 100, 345 S.W.2d 416 (1961).
45 17 Ill. App. 2d 497, 151 N.E.2d 128 (1958).
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was permanent. The defendant contended that error was com-
mitted in permitting Dr. Kesert to answer a hypothetical question
"based on the opinion of another expert." The court held that
there was no merit to this contention.
Dr. Kesert expressly stated the basis of his opinion as 1. the
evidence of (the plaintiff's) physical condition after his fall, and
2. the testimony of the electroencephalographs showing the pro-
gressive abnormality. These, according to the court, were facts in
evidence and were properly included in the hypothetical question
and were a proper basis of the opinion.
In State v. Carlson,4 6 a Dr. Davis testified that electroencepha-
lographic tracings showed an organic abnormality in the arson de-
fendant's brain. Except for this finding, the testimony was in gen-
eral terms indicating that electroencephalographic tracings like the
defendant's were seen in individuals who experienced various dis-
eases or injuries early in life, who had an emotional background of
an unstable environment, and in whom the emotional factors pro-
duced disturbances of behavior which consisted of irresistible im-
pulses.
No medical opinion was offered based upon the electroencepha-
lographic tracings, the facts as to the defendant's background and
early life, the circumstances of the alleged offense, or the defend-
ant's mental capacity or condition at the time of the offense. The
court held that the electroencephalographic tracings, practically
standing alone without expert medical testimony, were of no pro-
bative value.
In State v. Riggle,47 there being no electroencephalographic in-
strument in Wyoming, a murder defendant in that state was taken
to Salt Lake City to be examined by a Dr. Powell, a neurologist,
and have an electroencephalogram taken. The electroencephalo-
graphic tracings and an interpretation thereof by a medical expert
were admitted in evidence on the issue as to whether the de-
fendant was legally insane, meaning very briefly whether he did
not know what he was doing (perception) and, if he did know what
he was doing, whether he did not know he was doing something
wrong (notion). In this context Henry A. Davidson, M.D., points
out:
Crimes are often associated with violence to the perpetrator as
well as to the victim. An electroencephalogram may be helpful
with respect to behavior during a concussion-induced fugue. The
46 5 Wis.2d 595, 93 N.W.2d 354 (1958).
47 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349 (1956).
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description of the patients activities should indicate whether he
knew what he was doing or whether he really acted automatically;
whether he acted as if he felt he were doing something wrong, or
whether he acted reflexly.48
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAmS
Manfred S. Guttmacher, M.D., and Professor Henry Weihofen
state:
Unfortunately psychiatrists still are unable to apply any ... cer-
tain tests to solve most of their problems. Even the electro-
encephalograph requires interpretation of the 'brain wave' patterns
which the mechanism records, and interpretations may vary. It is
not likely that psychiatrists will, in the near future, be able to
attain such certainty in their diagnoses as to bring themselves with-
in the rule that 'where the testimony of a witness is contradicted
by incontrovertible physical facts the testimony cannot be ac-
cepted.' Until we have a procedure which gives assurance that
the expert psychiatric conclusions given in court represent a truly
scientific judgment, the courts will hesitate to adopt any hard and
fast rule that expert opinion is controlling.4 9
The following question and answer are from the Cleveland
Bar Association seminar on myositis ossificans-orthopedic and neu-
rological witnesses:
Q. Is there any norm that has been established for the interpreta-
tion of electroencephalograms? It is a matter of judgment of
each electroencephalographer, is that right?
A. Unfortunately, I am afraid you are right. There is a great
variation in the interpretation of these tracings.5 0
PROPERTY IN ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM
Electroencephalograms, like roentgenograms and electrocardio-
grams, according to Rowland H. Long, "are the property of the
physician who has made them while treating his patient, unless a
contrary agreement was made. There is no good reason why the
rule should be otherwise. Unexplained, these articles are mean-
ingless to the layman, but they constitute an important part of a
physician's records."51
48 H. DAVIDSON, FoRENsIc PsYCHIATRY 23 (2d ed. 1965).
49 M. GuTTAcHER & H. WImHoFEN, PsYcHIATRY AwD THE LAw 251-52 (1952).
50 PERSONAL INuRY AounAL 443 (1962).
51 R. LONG, THE PnysiciAN AND THE LAw 62 (1955).
